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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Année : 2008

Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation

Tor Eriksson
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Résumé

Variable pay links pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting more productive employees. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance pay on both incentives and sorting and analyzes the influence of repeated interactions between firms and employees on these effects. We show that (i) the opportunity to switch from a fixed wage to variable pay scheme increases the average effort level and its variance; (ii) high skill employees concentrate under the variable pay scheme; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages reduce the attraction of performance pay. Social motivation and reputation influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00331753 , version 1 (17-10-2008)

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Tor Eriksson, Marie Claire Villeval. Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 68 (2), pp. 412-421. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2007.10.003⟩. ⟨halshs-00331753⟩
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