Policy Involvement among Executive Leaders: Cancer Control in England and France, 1997-2007
Résumé
This paper explores the ways in which adopting national health policy initiatives might appeal to the interest patterns of political leaders. It first introduces a theoretical framework that bridges the concepts of office-keeping and office-seeking to blame avoidance and credit claiming, starting from the assumption that elected officials are systematically interested in the former and therefore conform to the latter. It then applies this framework to national cancer control programmes in England, France and the United States.
The wider aim of the paper is to reflect on the theoretical and methodological aspects of political interests for policy analysis, starting with the background assumption that policy-making is not conducted disinterestedly. Policy-makers respond to incentives and act along motives that are apt candidates for hypothesis generation and empirical verification. This paper thus intends to substantiate and operationalise the notion of political interests in policy-making.
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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