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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2008

Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction

Résumé

Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth ffects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00277283, version 1 (06-05-2008)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00277283 , version 1

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Nicolas Jacquemet, Stephane Luchini, Robert-Vincent Joule, Jason Shogren. Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction. 2008. ⟨halshs-00277283⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 06/04/2024
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