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EXCHANGE AS ENTRAPMENT: MERCENARY XENOPHON ?

Xenophon's *Anabasis* is a work of apologetics, written in response to attacks against the author. The work answers two types of accusation concerning exchange and the right way to conduct exchange. The first accusation appears as the collective pressure from the rank and file of the Ten Thousand: Xenophon attempts to counter the forceful accusations of corruption levelled at him by the troops. Part of the *Anabasis*— especially Book 7— is devoted to refuting such accusations. But Xenophon also uses the *Anabasis* to respond to another type of accusation, produced much later by his aristocratic peers rather than the rank and file. The Athenian general seeks to put as much distance as possible between himself and the disgraceful shadow of the mercenary. He must erase anything that might portray him to his readership as a paid soldier, on the move for base financial reasons. For a Greek aristocrat keen to demonstrate his detachment from the purely monetary, such a mercenary's status was necessarily compromising, especially since two barbarians assembled the mercenary host in question: the Persian Cyrus, then a Thracian, the ambiguous character of Seuthes. The present paper is offered as a reading of this double *exercice de style*.

INCORRUPTIBLE XENOPHON ?

By the end of the fifth century, aristocratic networks were increasingly controlled by the community, both inside and outside Athens, their very existence in the *polis* being tolerated only inasmuch as they could serve the *polis*.¹ Communal ideological control bore not only on exchanges between mass and elite (through the liturgical system), but also on the circulation of favours within the aristocratic sphere itself. The effects of this long term evolution were exacerbated by the impact of a momentous *événementiel* development: the massive intrusion of Persian gold.² The latter, in upsetting the old balances, alerted the citizens to the dangerous nature of aristocratic exchange: although it played a role in financing war,³ the King's gold mostly had a political impact— the seduction of local Greek elites.⁴ In constructing, to disastrous effect, personal links between Persia and Greek aristocracies, Persian gold led to the discrediting of all such ties, especially when these were accompanied by gift exchange.⁵

¹This is the central contribution of L. Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts* (1997), 106, in qualifying the sometimes too categorical views of G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (1987), 156-161. In Athens and especially in Sparta, the *polis* could designate citizens as ambassadors or military officials on account of special relations established abroad: *xenia* was not rejected as such, but rechannelled to the profit of the community.

²See more generally D. M. Lewis, "Persian Gold in Greek International Relations", in *L'or perse et l'histoire grecque* [REA 91], 1989, 227-236.

³This Persian bounty mostly showered down on Greece between 413 and 386. Fourth-century tradition spoke of 6000 talents handed over to the Spartans by the Persians in 413 and 405 (e.g. *Hellenica* 1.5.1-9). For the Athenians, witness the speedy reconstruction of the long Walls in 393.

⁴Witness the abrupt recall of Agesilaos from Asia, as he was on the verge of driving deeper into the Persian empire.

⁵Occasionally, corruption involves Greeks amongst each other. In the *Anabasis*, the Sinopeans and the Herakleians try to corrupt some of the officers among the Ten Thousand, when they hear of Xenophon's colonizing projects:

The relationship of *xenia*, notably expressed by the reciprocal offer of hospitality gifts (a transaction which could designate the whole relationship by metonymy), encapsulates all the ambiguities and misunderstandings involved.⁶ As it sometimes included exchanges between unequal partners, *xenia* could awaken the *polis*' suspicion: receiving hospitality gifts might make a citizen end up as a pawn in hands of foreign potentates, such as the Persian King or the King of Macedon.⁷ *Xenia* and corruption intermingled; the mere existence of *xenia* ties might suffice to awaken the suspicion of corruption.

The *Anabasis* shows the overlap, tending towards identity, between the two phenomena. When Hekatonymos, sent on embassy by the Sinopeans, advises the Ten Thousand to travel by sea rather than take the land route through Paphlagonian territory, his motives were immediately suspect: "Some of his hearers were suspicious that he spoke as he did out of friendship for Corylas, for he was his official representative at Sinope; others imagined that he even had the idea of obtaining gifts on account of this advice; while still others suspected that the real purpose of his speech was to prevent the Greeks from going by land and so doing some harm to the territory of the Sinopeans".⁸

Trapped in his *xenia* relationship with Seuthes, Xenophon also falls under the suspicion of having manipulated the army in order to receive gifts from the Thracian prince. The whole of Book 7 can be read as an answer to this accusations, in a balancing act between the demands of aristocratic friendship and the necessities of responding to mass pressure. Even before the first interview with Seuthes occurs in the narrative, Xenophon the author carefully stages the incorruptibility of Xenophon the character. When an envoy from Seuthes asks that Xenophon bring the Ten Thousand into Seuthes' employ,⁹ Xenophon answers, virtuously: "Why, the army is going to cross over; so far as that is concerned, let not Seuthes pay anything either to me or to any one else".¹⁰ Xenophon implicitly defends himself against any accusation that he led his men across the Straits into Europe, in exchange for a bribe. Likewise, after his reintegration in the

"When the Sinopeans and Heracleots heard it, they sent to Timasion and urged him to take in charge, *for a fee*, the matter of getting the army to sail away" (5, 6, 21: our emphasis). See also 5, 6, 26 et 35.

⁶*Xenia* usually unfurls according to a codified protocol, starting with a solemn utterance, pursued by the exchange of gifts and oaths, and ending with a handshake (*dexiôsis*). On the age and permanence of the institution, A. W. Adkins, "Friendship and Self-sufficiency in Homer and Aristotle", *CQ* 13 (1963), 30-45, here 30-32 and P. Gauthier, *Symbola* (1972), 22-23.

⁷See Demosthenes 18.284 and 19.195 and 314, pouring scorn on Aischines for being a *xenos* of Philip of Macedon and hence a traitor in his employ. S. Perlman, "On Bribing Athenian Ambassadors", *GRBS* 17 (1976), 223-233, has shown how the Persian (and later Macedonian) kings used hospitality gifts in diplomatic interaction. See also Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts* (1997), 184; P. Briant, *Histoire de l'Empire perse* (1996), 688 et P. Brun, *L'orateur Démade* (2000), 163.

⁸5.6.11. On Korylas, governor of Paphlagonia, see 6.1.2.

⁹The offer of presents remains implicit; but Seuthes also promises that in case of an agreement, Xenophon "would not be sorry for it" (7, 1, 5)

¹⁰7.1.6. In fact, Xenophon's intention at this point is to leave the Ten Thousand, in bitterness at the latter's ingratitude.

army, Xenophon declines Seuthes' offers, attractive as they might seem: "[Seuthes] begged him to bring the army to him, offering any promise whereby he imagined he could persuade him".¹¹ The author's strategy is easily detectable: to dispel any suspicion of shady dealings with the Thracian dynast, even before their first encounter.

In this respect, Xenophon's description of his first meeting with Seuthes appears surprising, since it takes place under the sign of aristocratic *entente*. The two men meet at night, in secret; while the wine goes round, in the Thracian fashion,¹² they invoke the relation of kinship (*sungeneia*)¹³ between Athenians and Thracians, and the concomitant tie of *philia*. This cordial atmosphere might suggest the establishment of closer, and more disreputable, links. However, Xenophon carefully deploys practical, and rhetorical, devices, to fend off any subsequent accusations of impropriety. Xenophon reminds Seuthes of the latter's attempts to corrupt him and of his own very proper refusals to listen to such proposals;¹⁴ Xenophon has come to meet Seuthes, only as a last resort, almost under compulsion.¹⁵ He has not given in to corruption, unlike those generals who tried to lead the Ten Thousand to the Thracian dynast, well before there was any pressing need to do so: a few pages earlier, Xenophon mentions that "Cleanor and Phryniscus wanted to lead the army to Seuthes, for he had been trying *to persuade them to this course* and had given one of them a horse and the other a woman".¹⁶ In contrast, Xenophon emphasizes his own incorruptibility, which he particularly sets forth by underlining the richness of the gifts promised by Seuthes: not a mere horse or even a woman, but "the places on the seacoast of which [he] holds possession".¹⁷

After these first explanations, Xenophon takes care to create a practical set-up to ensure absolute transparency. Before starting any dealings with Seuthes, he brings in men chosen from every regiment, "in whom each had confidence".¹⁸ The troops thus participates in the negotiations, and the rankers— the military equivalent of the *demos*— can bear testimony of Xenophon's good faith. Negotiation does not occur in the occult context of improper transactions, but leads to a collective agreement which concerns the whole army:¹⁹ Seuthes promises "to each soldier a Cyzicene, to the captains twice as much, and to the generals four times as much; furthermore, as

¹¹7.2.10.

¹²7.2.23

¹³7.2.31

¹⁴7.2.24-8

¹⁵Cf. 7.2.15.

¹⁶7.2.2.

¹⁷7.2.25.

¹⁸7.2.17 (see also 7.2.29).

¹⁹The two men grasp each other's right hand, establishing a personal tie *xenia*, only after the collective negotiation: 7.3.1.

much land as they might wish, yokes of oxen, and a fortified place upon the seacoast".²⁰ It is true that Seuthes also offers gifts to the leaders, on top of *misthos*;²¹ but these lavish presents are only a particular category within the broader rewards negotiated for the troops as a whole, and not a proof of improper dealings or treason. In order to illustrate the absolute blamelessness of his behaviour, Xenophon details his final measure to make the whole procedure obvious: when Seuthes meets the army, Xenophon bids him come forward, "in order that he might tell him within hearing of the greatest possible number what they had decided upon as advantageous".²² The Thracian prince repeats his proposals before all, and these proposals are accepted by a unanimous mass vote.²³

The point of all these precautions emerges in hindsight, at the end of the *Anabasis*, when after many events and useful service from the mercenaries, Seuthes, manipulated by his Greek adviser Herakleides, refuses to distribute the promised pay. The troops turn on Xenophon and formally accuse him.²⁴ An Arkadian plays the role of Thersites, delivering a vigorous prosecutorial speech to demand that Xenophon be stoned to death.²⁵ The argument is that Xenophon grew rich personally from his relation with Seuthes, while depriving the troops of their pay. Xenophon must defend himself in this improvised trial where his life hangs in the balance. He claims good faith, and attempts to involve the presumed corruptor: "For it is clear that, if I have received anything from Seuthes, he will demand it back from me, and, moreover, he will demand it back with justice if I am failing to fulfil to him the undertaking for which I was accepting his gifts".²⁶

The accusation is quite precise, and Xenophon himself points out its seriousness: *dôrodokia*, corruption, was generally punished by death.²⁷ By emphasizing the Thracian dynast's

²⁰7.2.36.

²¹Xenophon is offered an especially honourable position, since Seuthes proposes a very profitable marriage connection: "And to you, Xenophon, I will also give my daughter, and if you have a daughter, I will buy her after the Thracian fashion; and I will give you for a residence Bisanthe, the very fairest of all the places I have upon the seacoast" (7.2.38).

²²7.3.7.

²³Seuthes nonetheless omits any mention of the supplementary gifts intended for the generals: he vaguely speaks of "the customary pay" (7. 3.10).

²⁴7.6.8.

²⁵Cf. 7.6.9-10 and *Iliad* 2.212-44.

²⁶7.6.16-17. Xenophon claims he has not even received "what the other generals have received— nay, not even so much as some of the captains" (7. 6.19, referring back to 7. 5. 2-4).

²⁷On *dôrokodia*, see for the Athenian context F. D. Harvey, "Dona Ferentes: Some aspects of Bribery in Greek Politics", in P. Cartledge *et alii* (eds.), *Crux: Essays Presented to Ste. Croix* (1985), 76-117; D. M. MacDowell, "Athenian Laws about Bribery", *RIDA* 30 (1983), 57-78 and O. de Bruyn, *Les compétences judiciaires de l'Aréopage* (1995), 63-73, especially at 66: "Le droit athénien faisait la distinction entre deux types de corruption, l'une, relativement bénigne, entraînait le paiement d'une amende fixée au décuple de la somme reçue, l'autre, plus grave, entraînait la mort". Various judiciary procedures were deployed against this protean evil (*graphê dôrôn*, *eisangelia*, *euthunai* and *apocbeirotonia*), whose exact workings are unknown before Ephialtes (*pace* O. de Bruyn). Though the scene in the *Anabasis* is hardly a full trial, the accusation is serious enough to entail an unmistakable death penalty.

untrustworthiness, his own devotion to the army, and the latter's ingratitude, Xenophon managed to turn the Ten Thousand's opinion back in his favour.

All the same, the last conversation between Xenophon and Seuthes²⁸ casts a very peculiar light on the nature of their ties. While Xenophon starts by recounting his constant refusal of Seuthes' presents,²⁹ the thrust of his argument gradually changes during his speech: "[the Ten Thousand] accused me before the Lacedaemonians of regarding you more highly than I did the Lacedaemonians, while on their own account they charged me with being more concerned that your affairs should be well than that their own should be; and they also said that I had received gifts (*dōra*) from you. And yet, touching these gifts (*ta dōra*), do you imagine it was because they had observed in me some ill-will toward you that they charged me with having received them from you, or because they perceived in me abundant good-will for you? For my part, I presume that everybody believes he ought to show good-will to the man from whom he receives gifts. You, however, before I had rendered you any service, welcomed me with a pleasure which you showed by your eyes, your voice, and your gifts of hospitality, and you could not make promises enough about all that should be done for me".³⁰

In a spectacular *volte-face*, Xenophon finally admits that he has received many hospitality presents from Seuthes— not once, but many times. By a series of gradual shifts, he overturns his earlier viewpoint. He never received gifts; yet the soldiers believed he had received gifts; their reasons for believing this was that Xenophon's behaviour towards Seuthes was the behaviour of one who had accepted gifts; in actual fact, Seuthes *did* ply Xenophon with gifts...

In a few lines, Xenophon manages a virtuoso exercise in ideological gap-bridging, grounded in the ambiguity of *xenia*. His apparent duplicity reflects the implicit distinction, widely held in aristocratic circles, between hospitality presents which are a legitimate part of *xenia*, and the *dōra* which embody the attempt and the temptation of corruption, and which must be eschewed at all costs. This distinction— always suspect in the eyes of third party witnesses to transactions of exchange— allows Xenophon to enjoy the prestige of incorruptibility in the eyes of the soldiers, and the consequences of his devotion *qua* gift-receiver in his relation to Seuthes

²⁸7.7.39-47.

²⁹7.7.39-40: "And yet I make your own self my witness, along with the gods, who know, that I have neither received anything from you that was intended for the soldiers, nor have ever asked what was theirs for my private use, nor demanded from you what you had promised me; and I swear to you that even if you had offered to pay what was due to me, I should not have accepted it unless the soldiers also were at the same time to recover what was due to them".

³⁰7.7.44-6. *Xenios* must be translated as "hospitality gifts" and not "hospitality" *tout court*; *dōra* might be translated as "bribes", since these gifts are considered as corrupting.

ARISTOCRAT AND MERCENARY

Xenophon lies open to another accusation, not from his men, but from his fellow aristocrats, once the venture over. Xenophon was not only attacked *qua* corrupt leader, but also for having been a mercenary. In the fight for pay and implicated in the logic of demand and supply: the mercenary embodies a deeply ambiguous and contested figure in fourth century Greece. The resort to paid fighters was occasionally represented as a necessary evil for whoever employed them;³¹ but mercenary service in itself was difficult to represent in any sort of positive light. While the recipient of gifts could be attacked as corrupt, the mercenary not only finds himself in the delicate position of recipient, but also spoils the relation by introducing the principle of service-for-cash: in the end, the mercenary is imagined as an excluded figure, without ties, lawless.³²

Yet Xenophon at first sight seems complete outside the cash nexus of *misthos*. Throughout his works, he rails against mercenary exchange and its supposedly pernicious effects, partly as an heir to the old elitist views against coinage, partly under the influence of a double tradition, political and philosophical, opposed to money and trade in all its forms, the Sokratic current, and philolakonism.³³ This staunch opposition to *misthos*, constantly expressed in his works, might well be a veil drawn over his own status as a mercenary in Cyrus' army.

In fact, Xenophon seems to have been the target of attacks about his status as a mercenary during the expedition.³⁴ Amongst his more or less open adversaries, Isokrates is probably the figure with whom Xenophon's relations are most ambiguous. They came from the same deme, shared many ideas, and their relations were cordial enough for Isokrates to write an *epainos* for Gryllos, Xenophon's son, fallen at Second Mantinea.³⁵ Nonetheless, apart from various

³¹ As Cartledge has pointed out (*Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (1987), 323), all Spartan commanders in Asia used mercenaries against Artaxerxes II (as did the Athenians). By the mid-fourth century, recourse to mercenaries has become normal, to the extent that Demosthenes recognizes the practice as necessary (albeit regrettable); he simply asks for 25% at least of the relief expedition for Olynthos to be made up for citizens (*First Philippic* 19-21).

³² As Plato wrote (*Laws* 1. 630b), *misthophoroi* may be ready to die, but “prove themselves reckless, unjust, violent, and pre-eminently foolish”.

³³ I consider it unlikely that the Spartan hostility towards coinage is purely a Xenophontic construct, as suggested by O. Picard, “Entre public et privé: le cas de la monnaie”, *Ktèma* 23 (1998), 269; the contested monetarization of Spartan society may have entailed a hardening of positions, and hence the formalizing of what had earlier been a convention.

³⁴ See E. Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (1957), 293-295 (hypothetical, if coherent); L. Canfora, *Histoire de la littérature grecque d'Homère à Aristote* (1994), 383. Sophainetos of Stymphalos is claimed to have written an *Anabasis* of his own —four paltry fragments survive— with Xenophon apparently appearing in a far less favourable light. See *F.Gr.Hist.* 109 F 1-4 and A. von Mess, “Über die *Anabasis* des Sophainetos”, *RhM* 61 (1906), 360-390; A. Gwynn, “Xenophon and Sophainetos”, *CQ* 23 (1929), 38-39; J. Roy, “Xenophon's Evidence for the *Anabasis*”, *Athenaeum* 46 (1968), 44-45 and J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (1995), 63.

³⁵ Cf. Diog. Laert. 2.55. See V. J. Gray, “Xenophon and Isocrates”, in C. Rowe, M. Schofield *et al.*, *The Cambridge history of Greek and Roman political thought* (2000), 142-154.

disagreement on points of detail,³⁶ their respective interpretations of the Ten Thousand's trek radically differ.³⁷ For Isokrates, Cyrus had at his disposal "only six thousand Hellenes – not picked troops, but men who, owing to stress of circumstances, were unable to live in their own cities".³⁸ The *Anabasis* should be read in relation to these accusations:³⁹ as an apologetic work, intended as an addition to an ongoing debate whose terms were hardly in Xenophon's favour. To defend himself, Xenophon resorts to a triple strategy: he points out that the mercenaries did not form a homogeneous body and that all did not follow Cyrus for the same, shameful, reasons; he celebrates the nobility of the employer, the virtuous younger Cyrus; finally, he emphasizes his own disinterest for the mercenary's *misthos*.

On the Black Sea, at a point which seems particularly appropriate to found a Greek colony, Xenophon classifies the reasons which compelled the mercenaries to leave:

"For most of the soldiers had sailed away from Greece to undertake this service for pay not because their means were scanty, but because they knew by report of the noble character of Cyrus; some brought other men with them, some had even spent money of their own on the enterprise, while still another class had abandoned fathers and mothers, or had left children behind with the idea of getting money to bring back to them, all because they heard that the other people who served with Cyrus enjoyed abundant good fortune. Being men of this sort, therefore, they longed to return in safety to Greece."⁴⁰

Xenophon clearly distinguishes between two categories of Greeks: some have followed Cyrus out of noble motives, and even recruited men out of their own means;⁴¹ on other hand, many others have enrolled under Cyrus' banner only out of desire for profit. The Ten Thousand cannot be

³⁶For instance concerning Timotheos's role and personality, or even the elder Cyrus, since Isokrates compares Evagoras to Cyrus, to the latter's disadvantage (9.37-8).

³⁷Isokrates considers the mercenaries as the principal cause of the fourth-century crisis of *polis*; this interpretation is followed, without much critical distance, by L. Marinović, *Le mercenariat grec au IV^e siècle avant notre ère et la crise de la polis* (1988), 237-269.

³⁸*Panegyrikos* 145-6. This text was published in summer 380, that is, before Xenophon's *Anabasis*, which must be read as a response to Isokratean criticism, if one follows the dating proposed in Dillery, *Xenophon and his history of his times* (1995), 69, with earlier bibliography at 264 n. 1 (after Leuktra and the loss of the estate at Skillous). In any case, Xenophon did not need the stimulus of Isokrates' text to feel the need for self-exculpation.

³⁹Isokrates goes so far as to call the mercenaries "common enemies of mankind" (*On the Peace* 46). However, this attitude becomes more nuanced in his last works. In the *Philip*, Isokrates claims that the potential conquest of the Persian empire would be facilitated by the plentiful existence of mercenaries, easy to corrupt, whereas "[under Cyrus] in those days there was no body of professional soldiers."

⁴⁰6.4.8; Xenophon repeats this passage in *Cyropaedia*, 4.2.10.

⁴¹Some Greek aristocrats acted as recruiting sergeants: G. Nussbaum, "The Captains in the Army of the Ten Thousand", *C&M* 20 (1959), 19, and L. Marinović, *Le mercenariat grec au IV^e siècle avant notre ère et la crise de la polis* (1988), 141 n.17.

considered as a homogenous group: those who followed Cyrus on account of his noble character are ready to found a *polis* on this welcoming coast and hence increase Hellas in Asia,⁴² whereas the rank and file, along with some officers, would rather return to Greece laden with money.⁴³ Symptomatically, the soldiers refuse Xenophon's colonial project, in favour of the financially attractive proposals put forward by another commander, Timasion, who promises good pay if they embark with him.⁴⁴ Within the army, tensions separate the elite from the mass of rankers, but also introduce splits between members of the elite.⁴⁵

A glance at the *Cyropaedia* will allow us to understand more closely these fracture lines which, for Xenophon, are present in any army. The *Cyropaedia* also shows men leaving their fatherland under the command of a young, promising, foreign leader: when the Elder Cyrus decides to continue waging war on the Assyrian empire, after his first victories, many Medes elect to follow him. As in the *Anabasis*, some accompany him because they admire "his ways".⁴⁶ Many enrol out of gratitude towards the Persian leader: "grateful to him for freeing them, as they thought, from great impending danger", still others "wished to requite him for some service he had for them while he was growing up in Media".⁴⁷ But this framework of reciprocity is not operative for all: many follow Cyrus only "when the report spread that [Cyrus] would lead them to rich plunder".⁴⁸

As in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon carefully distinguishes two groups within the Median army: the rank and file, on the one hand, drawn by *misthoi* and the wealth it hopes to win during the war of conquest,⁴⁹ on the other, those few good men who temporarily suspend their faithfulness towards their rightful ruler, out of gratitude towards the elder Cyrus. The military elite among the Medes defines itself in a system where social dynamics are more operative than calculations of profit; Cyrus insists on this point in a speech to his "staff officers":⁵⁰ "Men of Media and all here

⁴² On Xenophon as failed oikist, see I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (1987), 102-104. This pan-Hellenic project (also found in Isokrates, *Philip* 120-1) could redeem the purely mercenary venture of the Ten Thousand. See especially Isokrates, *Peace* 24, praising Athenodoros and Kallistratos, the first a private individual, and the second an exile, but both city founders in Thrace: "And those who claim the right to stand at the head of the Hellenes ought to become leaders of such enterprises [*i.e.* to found new *poleis*] much rather than of war and of hiring armies".

⁴³ See Marinovic, *Le mercenariat grec au IV^e siècle avant notre ère et la crise de la polis* (1988), 141-142 (with references) and J. Roy, "The Mercenaries of Cyrus", *Historia* 16 (1967), 317-318, pointing out that the army contains four thousand Arkadians and two thousand Achaians, from the poorest parts of Greece (cf. 6.2.10). See also J. Roy, "Arcadian Nationality as seen in Xenophon's *Anabasis*", *Mnemosyne* 25 (1972), 129-136 and Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (1995), 80-81 and 87-89, putting it elegantly "Greece and greed are somehow connected".

⁴⁴ 5.6.23. Likewise, another fellow-officer and rival of Xenophon's, makes the same promise of pay: 5.6.56.

⁴⁵ Silanos of Ambrakia, Thorax of Boiotia and Timasion of Dardanos are members of the elite who enrolled out of greed: e.g. 7.3.18, 7.3.27, 7.5.4 (Timasion); 6.4.14 (Silanos); 5.6.19 (Thorax).

⁴⁶ *Cyr.* 4.2.10

⁴⁷ *Cyr.* 4.2.10. Xenophon adds that he had obtained favours from his grandfather for many of them, through his *philanthropia*. Cf. *Cyr.* 4.2.11: men follow Cyrus "not from compulsion but of their own free will and out of gratitude".

⁴⁸ *Cyr.* 4.2.10.

⁴⁹ See 7.5.3-4, where *dôru* meant for the generals and *lochagoi* are opposed to the *misthoi* meant for the army.

⁵⁰ *Cyr.* 3.3.12 for the meaning of *epikairios*.

present, I am very sure that you came out with me, not because you desired to get money by it, nor because you thought that in this you were doing Cyaxares a service; but it was to me that you wished to do this favour, and it was out of regard for me that you were willing to make the night march and to brave dangers with me".⁵¹

In the *Cyropaedia*, the best of the Medes join Cyrus' army to honour a relationship where mutual agreement and aristocratic distinction play the most important part. This is the angle which Xenophon uses to justify his own enrolment in the Ten Thousand. "There was a man in the army named Xenophon, an Athenian, who was neither general nor captain nor private, but had accompanied the expedition because Proxenus, *an old guest-friend of his*, had sent him at his home an invitation to go with him".⁵² By defining the exact process of his enrolment negatively, without assigning a precise status to himself, Xenophon avoids any embarrassing questions. Furthermore, the appearance of Xenophon *qua* character in the work is delayed until Book 3, when Cyrus' expedition proper is over: this reflects the determination shown by Xenophon *qua* author to avoid at all costs having to deal with his participation in a mercenary venture.⁵³ Apparently, he ended up at Kounaxa out of the most aristocratic of reasons: far from being a paid mercenary, he tagged along with the troops because of his *xenia* ties with Proxenos of Boiotia. Likewise, Cyrus himself asked him personally to stay, in an attempt to retain him:⁵⁴ just as the Medes leave Kyaxares, in the *Cyropaedia*, without denying their ties with him, Xenophon temporarily suspended his loyalty to his *polis*⁵⁵ so as to honour his *philia* relationship with Proxenos, then Cyrus.⁵⁶

Within this emphasis on interpersonal ties, the portrait of Cyrus is a potent element in Xenophon's apologetic strategy: the Persian prince's extraordinary virtues explain and legitimate Xenophon's rallying to him. Posthumous praise of Cyrus goes hand in hand with justification of

⁵¹*Cyr.* 5.1.20-21. Symptomatically, Cyrus thanks them for following them by declaring his gratitude: "For this I am grateful to you – I should be in the wrong no to do so; but I do not think that I am as yet in a position to make you an adequate return, and this I am not ashamed to say". By an extraordinary *retournement*, Cyrus' inability to requite past service becomes a claim on the allies' faithfulness: Cyrus wishes those who follow him to continue to do, so that he may later show them gratitude.

⁵²3.1.4. See Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (1987), 47.

⁵³ In the first part of the tale, Xenophon *qua* actor is perhaps to be detected under the rather self-important pseudonym Theopompos, "God-sent" (2.1.12-13). See O. Lendle, *Kommentar zu Xenophons Anabasis* (1995), 94 and L. Canfora, *Une profession dangereuse. Les penseurs grecs dans la cité* (2001), 36-37. All the same, Xenophon has already appeared, fleetingly, just before Kounaxa (1.8.15), allowing Xenophon *qua* author to show that he knew Cyrus personally.

⁵⁴3.1.9.

⁵⁵ Xenophon follows poorly (or not at all) Sokrates' warning not to embark on the venture: Sokrates feared that Xenophon's friendship for Cyrus might be ill considered by the city (1.3.5-7). In this passage, Xenophon *qua* author condemns himself, as he frequently does in the *Memorabilia*. See V. J. Gray, *The Framing of Socrates. The Literary Interpretation of Xenophon's Memorabilia* (1998), 98-99, analyzing Xenophon's strategies for self-presentation, between blame and self-celebration.

⁵⁶Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (1957), 90-92, holds that Xenophon followed Cyrus for financial reasons: perhaps, but Xenophon tried very hard to dispel any suspicion of such behaviour.

the author.⁵⁷ Cyrus' virtues appear numberless:⁵⁸ the barbarian potentate knew how to create gratitude towards him, and hence the infrangible political loyalty of Greeks and Persians alike.⁵⁹ Cyrus thus entraps aristocratic Greeks in a network of reciprocal ties, which works to his profit. When Xenophon explains their loyalty, he insist both on the close links between the Greeks themselves, and their shared feeling of obligation towards Cyrus: "Then, although the Greeks were fearful of the journey and unwilling to go on, most of them did, nevertheless, out of shame before one another and before Cyrus, continue the march. And Xenophon was one of this number".⁶⁰ Here the author does not mention increase in pay, which he had earlier described to explain the rallying of the Greek rank and file.⁶¹ Xenophon merely writes of reasons drawn from the world of reciprocity: to forsake Cyrus would have been shameful and ungrateful,⁶² in one of those precise moments of danger which, in Xenophon's eyes, act as a revelator of true friendship as opposed to pretence.⁶³

In addition to presenting himself as an aristocrat entrapped in *philia* and *xenia*,⁶⁴ Xenophon emphasizes several times that he did not grow rich through mercenary status or service on the expedition. This angle helps understand the Skillous digression (as it is often called, rather clumsily, by readers of the *Anabasis*):

"There, also, they divided the money received from the sale of the booty. And the tithe, which they set apart for Apollo and for Artemis of the Ephesians, was distributed among the generals, each taking his portion to keep safely for the gods; and the portion that fell to Cheirisophus was given to Neon the Asinaean. As for Xenophon, he caused a votive offering to be made out of Apollo's share of his portion and dedicated it in the treasury of the Athenians at Delphi. He

⁵⁷See already F. Durrbach, "L'apologie de Xénophon dans l'*Anabase*", *REG* 6 (1893), 343-386, at 348: "En faisant le panégyrique [de Cyrus et de Cléarque], c'est sa propre cause qu'il plaide".

⁵⁸See the praise for the dead Cyrus at 1.9.

⁵⁹*Oecon.* 4.18: "it is said that not a man deserted from Cyrus to the king". M. Gabrielli, "Transports et logistique militaire dans l'*Anabase*", in P. Briant (éd.), *Dans les pas des Dix-Mille* (1995), 109-122, shows that the actual situation was perhaps otherwise. In fact, Xenophon reveals the occurrence of unrest at Dana (1.2.10), recounts the betrayal of Orontas in detail (1.6.1-11), and mentions hostility to Cyrus in Lykaonia and Kilikia (see C. J. Tuplin, "On the Track of the Ten Thousand", *REA* 101 (1999), 346).

⁶⁰3.1.10.

⁶¹Cyrus increased the *misthos* in order to convince the Greeks to follow him against the King: 1.3.21 and especially 1.4.13: "he promised that he would give every man five minas in silver when they reached Babylon and their pay in full until he brought the Greeks back to Ionia again. *By these promises the greater part of the Greek army was persuaded*" (our emphasis).

⁶²Cyrus skilfully appeals to the weight of moral obligation, while exploiting strategically any failings to this code. When two Greek officers abandon him during the expedition, he forgives them and even spares their families, which he had kept as hostages: "as for the Greeks, even those who had been somewhat despondent in regard to the upward march, when they heard of the magnanimity of Cyrus they continued on their way *with greater satisfaction and eagerness*" (1.4.9: our emphasis). Cyrus plays on the whole repertory of reciprocity to bind the Greeks and their leaders to him.

⁶³*Mem.* 2.4.6: friends should be faithful in times of peril.

⁶⁴Cyrus' army is founded on a network of *xenia* ties: see Herman, *Ritualised Friendship* (1987), 98-101 et Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts* (1997), 119-120.

inscribed upon it his own name and that of Proxenus, who was killed with Clearchus; for Proxenus was his guest-friend. The share which belonged to Artemis of the Ephesians he left behind, at the time when he was returning from Asia with Agesilaus to take part in the campaign against Boeotia, in charge of Megabyzus, the sacristan of Artemis, for the reason that his own journey seemed likely to be a dangerous one; and his instructions were that in case he should escape with his life, the money was to be returned to him, but in case any ill should befall him, Megabyzus was to cause to be made and dedicated to Artemis whatever offering he thought would please the goddess. In the time of Xenophon's exile and while he was living at Scillus, near Olympia, where he had been established as a colonist by the Lacedaemonians, Megabyzus came to Olympia to attend the games and returned to him (ἐποδ...δωσι) his deposit. Upon receiving it Xenophon bought a plot of ground for the goddess in a place which Apollo's oracle appointed".⁶⁵

This is no *excursus* as foreign body in the narrative, but a "digression" carefully contrived to give an image of Xenophon as disinterested actor. In a context where receiving money immediate creates suspicion, he takes care to account for money won during the exhibition. First, it comes out of booty captured from the enemy, and not out of *misthos* begged for from a more powerful figure; it thus is a share of *time* received legitimately by Xenophon *qua* military officer in the expedition. Furthermore, these riches are not used for personal profit, but immediately converted into dedications to the gods, and immobilized in a treasury; finally, part of the booty is used to celebrate the *xenia* ties between Xenophon and Proxenos, who has died after Kounaxa. Gains are thus deployed to create harmonious relationships with men and with gods.⁶⁶

Xenophon *qua* aristocrat refuses the salaried relation implied by mercenary service, and keeps shares of booty, gloriously won. Better still: he turns down any form of payment for services as leader of the expedition.⁶⁷ When Seuthes finally decides to pay out the salary he has promised, Xenophon elects not to draw his pay. When he sees Charminos and Polynikos of Sparta, his reaction is to hand things over: "This property has been saved for the army through you, and to you I turn it over; do you, then, dispose of it and make the distribution to the army.' They, accordingly, took it over, appointed booty-vendors, and proceeded to sell it; and they incurred a great deal of blame. As for Xenophon, he would not go near them but it was plain that he was

⁶⁵5.3.4-7.

⁶⁶The donation to Artemis, as an act of "gratification" (*charieisthai*), takes place in a horizon of reciprocity: in return, Xenophon expects the deity's protection over his life and property. Hence the inscription Xenophon ordered set up by the small shrine he built on his estate (5.3.13): "The place is sacred to Artemis. He who holds it and enjoys its fruits must offer the tithe every year in sacrifice, and from the remainder must keep the temple in repair. *If any one leaves these things undone, the goddess will look to it*" (our emphasis). In exchange for benefaction, the goddess herself can take the place of the owner, if the latter should be incapacitated.

⁶⁷7.5.2-3. When Herakleides proposes that Xenophon take his share, the latter replies: "Well, for my part I am content to get something at a later time; give rather to these generals and captains who have followed with me".

making preparations for his homeward journey; [...]. His friends in the camp, however, came to him and begged him not to depart until he should lead the army away and turn it over to Thibron".⁶⁸ The author thus opposes his faithful companions with the fickle, ungrateful rank and file, which, like the carping *demoi* in Athens, is concerned only with *misthoi*.

Xenophon refuses the *misthos* which he has a right to; he leaves the army poorer, hardly able to sacrifice or keep up the *xenia* exchange with guest-friends.⁶⁹ When Eukleides of Phleious asks him how much gold he has, he answers, under oath, "that he would not have even enough money to pay his travelling expenses on the way home unless he should sell his horse and what he had about his person".⁷⁰ Nonetheless, thanks to a last razzia, Xenophon exits this impoverished state, at the last moment. For this ultimate foray, Xenophon takes with him "those captains who were his closest friends and others who had proved themselves trustworthy throughout, in order that he might do them a good turn".⁷¹ The project is conceived in a spirit of reciprocity and of distinction, unlike the purely contractual links Xenophon kept with the remainder of the Ten Thousand.

After the success of the foray, "the Laconians, the captains, the other generals, and the soldiers joined in arranging matters so that he got the pick of horses and teams of oxen and all the rest; the result was, *that he was now able even to do a kindness to another*".⁷² The *Anabasis* comes to its end, and the author can offer a picture of himself untainted by any salaried transaction. Unlike pay, booty is a highly positive mode of wealth acquisition,⁷³ at least when it is not acquired off allies. In addition, this sudden enrichment is legitimizing in more ways than one: the Spartans allow Xenophon to dispose of the booty, and hence grant him recognition and honour, at an exceptional level.⁷⁴ Xenophon increases his fortune, without receiving any *misthos*; he avoids the

⁶⁸7.7.56-7. Cf. 7.5.3; 7.6.19. Xenophon has also just refused the silver talent's worth of compensation offered by Seuthes (7.7.53-4). See O. Lendle, *Kommentar zu Xenophons Anabasis* (1995), 476.

⁶⁹7.8.5-6. When Bion and Nausikleides arrive "with money to give to the army", they strike up a hospitality tie with Xenophon, buying back the horse Xenophon has been forced to sell off, "and would not accept from him the price of it". The *misthos* brought by the two Spartans only concerns the army, and does not preclude Xenophon's personal relationship of *xenia*, whence the issue of money has been evacuated.

⁷⁰7.8.2. Xenophon offers a double religious guarantee, in the form of the oath and the reaction of the seer, for his truthfulness.

⁷¹7.8.12. In addition, Xenophon points out that those who accompany him against his will are excluded from the distribution of booty: after leaving the army, Xenophon is no longer beholden to the fair distribution of a share of booty to everyone.

⁷²7.8.23.

⁷³*contra* Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (1995), 91: "While it is probably asking too much to believe that Xenophon intentionally portrayed himself negatively in this the final scene of the *Anabasis*, one cannot resist noting that the episode represents the very kind of independent action aimed at profit that he earlier so often deplored". But this action does not mar the author's self-representation: Xenophon has left the army, and seizes, quite legitimately, booty which he is granted the first share, as a signal token of honour. See Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (1957), 294-295.

⁷⁴ Likewise, the Spartan commander enjoys the absolute control over the disposal of booty: *Hell.* 4.1.26-7.

fraught position of the recipient, stepping into the symbolical superiority of the giver of gifts, the initiator of the exchange of *charis*.

In his relations with the Ten Thousand, Xenophon claims to have behaved in completely transparent manner. He insistently portrays himself as incorruptible, accused unjustly by an ungrateful, envious mob. This first rewriting of history is compounded by a second one, whose function is to write out Xenophon's status as mercenary. Xenophon followed a good man, his guest-friend, into a military campaign, he never really received any pay, he finally grew rich honourably: Xenophon writes his eastern venture as the trajectory of an aristocrat constantly privileging the ties of *philia* over the for-pay system of *misthos*. The issue of course is not to find the truthfulness of this portrait; our knowledge is definitely skewed by the many rhetorical strategies and smoke screens deployed by the author. What matters is the defining processes applied in the early fourth century to the constitution of norms of legitimate exchange, at the intersection of both democratic and aristocratic pressure, between the spectre of corruption and the taint of salarial relations.

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