Capital accumulation, welfare and the emergence of pension fund activism

Pascal Belan (1) , Philippe Michel (2) , Bertrand Wigniolle (3, 4)

1 LEN - Laboratoire d'économie de Nantes
2 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
3 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
4 PSE - Paris School of Economics

This paper presents an overlapping generations model with altruistic consumers, in which pension funds, by holding a signi...cant share of capital assets, produce non competitive behavior. We study the consequences of such behavior on capital accumulation and welfare in the long run when subsidies are associated with contributions to pension funds. If bequests are operative and the subsidy rate is not too high, the capital stock increases with the introduction of pension funds, and this increases long run utility. If bequests are not operative without pension funds, the rise in long-run welfare is no longer guaranteed, even if the subsidy rate is low.

Mots clés: imperfect competition; capital accumulation; pension funds; <br />altruism

Domaines: Economies et finances

Pascal Belan, Philippe Michel, Bertrand Wigniolle. Capital accumulation, welfare and the emergence of pension fund activism. FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis, 2007, 23 (2), pp.54-82. ⟨10.1628/001522107X186728⟩. ⟨halshs-00268847⟩