Migration as an antidote to rent-seeking?
Résumé
We develop a new mechanism through which skilled migration may influence economic
performance in the sending country. If agents can choose between acting as
rent-seekers and engaging in productive activities, and only productive skills are exportable,
a positive probability of migration (to a more secure economy) reduces the
relative expected returns from rent-seeking, thus decreasing the proportion of skilled
workers who opt for ”parasitic” activities. Such an improvement in the allocation of
talent may prevail over the loss of skilled workers due to outmigration. However, we
show that this result is not robust to the introduction of endogenous protection. If productive
workers share their resources between accumulation of productive capital and
investment in security, prospective migration may induce a weaker protection against
rent-seeking, which in turn might depress average income in the source economy.
performance in the sending country. If agents can choose between acting as
rent-seekers and engaging in productive activities, and only productive skills are exportable,
a positive probability of migration (to a more secure economy) reduces the
relative expected returns from rent-seeking, thus decreasing the proportion of skilled
workers who opt for ”parasitic” activities. Such an improvement in the allocation of
talent may prevail over the loss of skilled workers due to outmigration. However, we
show that this result is not robust to the introduction of endogenous protection. If productive
workers share their resources between accumulation of productive capital and
investment in security, prospective migration may induce a weaker protection against
rent-seeking, which in turn might depress average income in the source economy.
Domaines
Economies et finances
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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