On the Chacteristic Numbers of Voting Games

Vincent Merlin (1) , Matthieu Martin (2)

1 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management
2 THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications

This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set
for any proper voting game. We present an upper bound on
the number of alternatives which guarantees the non
emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this
bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton
and Salles (1990) for quota games.

Mots clés: voting game; core; stability set

Domaines: Economies et finances

Vincent Merlin, Matthieu Martin. On the Chacteristic Numbers of Voting Games. International Game Theory Review, 2006, 8 (4), pp.643--654. ⟨10.1142/S0219198906001156⟩. ⟨halshs-00010172⟩